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Nonnegative Matrix Factorization Applied to
Nonlinear Speech and Image Cryptosystems
Shengli Xie, Senior Member, IEEE, Zuyuan Yang, and Yuli Fu
Abstract—Nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) is widely
used in signal separation and image compression. Motivated
by its successful applications, we propose a new cryptosystem
based on NMF, where the nonlinear mixing (NLM) model with
a strong noise is introduced for encryption and NMF is used for
decryption. The security of the cryptosystem relies on following
two facts: 1) the constructed multivariable nonlinear function is
not invertible; 2) the process of NMF is unilateral, if the inverse
matrix of the constructed linear mixing matrix is not nonnegative.
Comparing with Lin’s method (2006) that is a theoretical scheme
using one-time Padding in the cryptosystem, our cipher can be
used repeatedly for the practical request, i.e., multitme padding is
used in our cryptosystem. Also, there is no restriction on statistical
characteristics of the ciphers and the plaintexts. Thus, more
signals can be processed (successfully encrypted and decrypted),
no matter they are correlative, sparse, or Gaussian. Furthermore,
instead of the number of zero-crossing-based method that is often
unstable in encryption and decryption, an improved method based
on the kurtosis of the signals is introduced to solve permutation
ambiguities in waveform reconstruction. Simulations are given to
illustrate security and availability of our cryptosystem.
Index Terms—Nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF), blind
source separation (BSS), signal encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the fast development of the information tech-nology, the communication between persons becomes
more and more convenient, meantime, the security has been
attracting more and more attention. As a result, the encryption
for information or signals is a natural choice, and multifar-
ious methods have been utilized, such as the traditional data
encryption standard (DES) and Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
(RSA) [1]–[3]. The analog encryption is another technique used
in speech communication [4]. Besides, the method based on
chaotic system and some other methods have also been devel-
oped [5]–[8]. In fact, for speech and image sources, the original
plaintexts are composed of partly distorted samples. So, in the
decryption, an efficient estimation needs to be used to recover
the plaintext, instead of the unbiased estimation. It is acceptable
to recover the plaintext approximately and not analytically.
To this end, a new technique based on blind source separation
(BSS) is applied to image and speech encryption [9]–[11].
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Considering the cryptosystem, it adopts the linear encryption
scheme and its security relies on the difficulty of solving
the underdetermined BSS problem, instead of the traditional
apparently intractability of the computational problem. It is an
attractive symmetric-key cryptosystem, where the encryption is
quite laconic and the decryption is also very convenient using
independent component analysis (ICA) algorithms [12]–[17].
However, the following implicit assumptions limit its practical
application: 1) the plaintext signals are mutually independent,
and there is at most one Gaussian signal; 2) the cipher signals
are mutually independent and one cipher should be used only
once, i.e., one-time padding. The limits of this cryptosystem
are based on the reasons that many real signals are correlative
or dependent, such as image signals, and it is quite trouble-
some to use one-time padding since the high cost of frequent
transmission of the keys or the secret seeds in a symmetric-key
encryption scheme, especially for online encryption where the
signal is encrypted frame by frame [11]. Usually, speech and
image signals are sparse (or sparse in a transform domain). The
sparsity is often successfully used to solve underdetermined
BSS [18]–[22]. From paper [22], one can find that the quality
of the separation for underdetermined BSS would be improved
when the sparsity of the sources goes higher. Therefore, for this
cryptosystem, the security may be destroyed by the sparsity
of the sources. In fact, it is nearly inevitable when the cipher
is used repeatedly (i.e., multitme padding). This phenomenon
will be verified in Section V.
From above analysis, one can see that the assumption of one-
time padding is necessary in the cryptosystem based on BSS/
ICA, and it cannot be extended to multitme padding. Further-
more, the ICA algorithms may fail for the separation of depen-
dent signals since the independence of the plaintext is required
for a better decryption. So, it is an unsolved problem to design
a more secure and practical cryptosystem using the BSS tech-
nology, especially for sparse and dependent signals.
Generally speaking, the decryption process is equivalent to
matrix factorization, including the decryption algorithms based
on ICA and second order statistics [23]. Nonnegative matrix
factorization (NMF) is one of the directions in matrix factor-
ization [24]. The convergence of the algorithm is analyzed in
[25]. Furthermore, some relative mature algorithms are also de-
veloped [26]–[29] and work well especially for sparse signal.
Since NMF algorithms do not require statistical characteristics
of the original signals, it can be used for the decryption of the
correlative or dependent signals, Gaussian signals et al..
As mentioned above, there exist several drawbacks for the
BSS/ICA-based cryptosystem in practice. In this study, the en-
cryption is implemented via two parts of ciphers. The first part
and the second part are generated by two key signal generators
1549-8328/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE
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(KSGs) driven by secret seeds and , respectively. Usually,
the first part is set to be static while the second part is set to be
dynamic for different encryptions. The decryption will be im-
plemented using NMF and the static part of the same ciphers
[30]. A nonlinear mixing (NLM) model with a strong noise is
introduced for encryption, and a NMF algorithm is utilized for
decryption. The security of our cryptosystem is proved for some
usual attacks, such as ciphertext-only attack, known-plaintext
attack, and chosen-plaintext attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the NMF model and NLM model with a strong noise.
Section III describes the structure of the proposed cryptosystem.
Section IV introduces the construction of the nonlinear func-
tion (NLF) and the linear mixing matrix. Simulations and dis-
cussions are introduced in Section V. Finally, conclusions are
presented in Section VI.
II. NMF MODEL AND NLM MODEL
Before introducing the models, two definitions are given by:
Definition 1: For multivariable function
and the fixed variables of it, a -conditional func-
tion is defined as , where
, and means cardinality of a set.
Definition 2: For the -conditional function
of , when , if
, such that , then is -conditionally
invertible with respect to . And is the corresponding
-conditional inverse function of with respect to .
Remarks: If is not -conditionally invertible
to , since at least two of the rest variables are free. If
, although there is only one free variable, may be still not
invertible (e.g., is a transcendental function, see model (14)).
A. NMF Model
For nonnegative data matrix
, the aim of the matrix factorization is to find two non-
negative matrix and
, such that . The following approximate de-
composition is generally considered [27], [29]:
(1)
where is the error matrix,
is a vector of the observed signals at the
discrete time instants , and is
a vector of the components or source signals at the same
time instant, generally, . The scalar form of the
model (1) is:
. The following notations are used:
, and means the -element
of the matrix .
B. NLM Model and Demixing Model
Given the signal matrix
and the strong noise matrix ,
then the NLM model respect to with a strong noise is
(2)
where , or equivalently in a scalar form as
and is
a NLF. If is known, the demixing model is
(3)
or equivalently in a scalar form as
, where
is the -conditional inverse function of
respect to . Note that the noise in the NLM model could
be very strong.
III. PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM
First of all, the general assumptions of a useful cryptosystem
are considered as 1) validity: the signals can be decrypted effi-
ciently after the encryption; 2) security: the signals can not be
decrypted without the cipher, meantime, the cipher can not be
obtained from the public plaintext when the Multi-Time padding
method is adopted. And the corresponding typical attacks to a
cryptosystem are:
Attack 1: ciphertext-only attack, the attacker knows only the
ciphertext and aims at the plaintext.
Attack 2: known-plaintext attack, the attacker knows parts of
the pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, and aims at the cipher.
Attack 3: chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker can select
some special pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, and aims at the
cipher.
Considering the BSS/ICA-based cryptosystem in [11], we
have two conclusions as follows.
Theorem 1: The BSS/ICA-based cryptosystem fails for de-
pendent or Gaussian sources, i.e., the cryptosystem cannot work
in the case of more than 2 dependent or Gaussian plaintexts.
It is easy to prove the theorem, since the validity of the cryp-
tosystem is violated and at least two plaintexts cannot be de-
crypted.
Theorem 2: To encrypt the sparse signals, the one-time
padding method cannot be extended into the multitme padding,
i.e., the BSS/ICA-based cryptosystem is not secure when the
multitme padding method is adopted.
The proof is given in Appendix I.
Remarks: Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 express the restrictions
on the cryptosystem in [11], and the trap for sparse signal en-
cryption exists widely in the linear encryption scheme. The phe-
nomena are verified in Section V. Furthermore, with the in-
crease of the prior information, the attack becomes easier. In
fact, according to the proof of the Theorem 2, no matter the
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the proposed cryptosystem.
source signal is sparse or not, the linear BSS/ICA-based cryp-
tosystem using the multitme padding cannot protect the plain-
texts from the Attack 2 and the Attack 3. Also, the proof supplies
a method to decrypt the plaintext without the cipher.
The nonlinear encryption scheme will be introduced. The
block diagram of the proposed cryptosystem is shown in Fig. 1,
mainly including the preprocessing, the encryption, the decryp-
tion, and the waveform reconstruction. The full structure will
be introduced in detail in this Section.
A. Preprocessing
For a source signal , at first, using segment splitter in [11],
it is divided into frames, then the each frame is put into seg-
ments with the unify length . The samples in every segment
are transformed into nonnegative ones by an invertible regular-
ized transformation (RT). Also, after dividing by maximal norm
of the signals, the nonnegative signals are restricted in the in-
terval . The waveform information of every segment is
stored in a definite format, including kurtosis (kurt), maximum
, and minimum . It is inserted into the head data
of the encrypted signal in a definite format for transmission, to-
gether with the parameters .
The sign function is utilized to define the RT as
(4)
where is the ith segment of the th frame
if
else. (5)
B. Encryption
Assumptions: 1) The data matrix of the nth frame is
. 2) The key signal matrix
generated by is .
3) The NLF matrix is , and the cipher-
text data matrix is
, where
, and
, for . Then the encryption is
described by
(6)
where is nonnegative matrix generated by the
seed and distributes uniformly between and 1.
There exists a function matrix , such that the model (6) can
be rewritten as follows (see also the model (16))
(7)
where , i.e.,
(8)
or equivalently in a scalar form as
, and
. Suppose that the key signal is
the noise, then the model (7) is a NLM model respect to
with a strong noise, and it can also be regarded as a post-NLM
model respect to .
According to the model (7), the NLF matrix plays a key
role in the security of the cryptosystem, and the construction of
it will be exploited in the next Section. The source signal
is encrypted frame by frame with the same method, where the
ciphers and the nonlinear functions can be used repeatedly.
The styles of the nonlinear functions are public, and their param-
eters can be inserted into the head data of the encrypted signal
in a definite format for transmission.
C. Decryption
After receiving the encrypted frame (i.e., the ciphertext),
combining with the cipher regenerated by and the public NLF
(see Section IV), we can obtain a linear mixture of the plaintext,
according to the models (3), (7), and (8), i.e.,
(9)
where
, and is the -con-
ditional inverse function of respect to .
Note that is calculated analytically, both the mixing
matrix and the plaintext (or are nonnegative, then
(or is nonnegative. Based on the model (1), where
, the plaintext signals can be decrypted from
using the NMF algorithm, except for the indeterminacy of per-
mutation and scale.
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TABLE I
WAVEFORM INFORMATION OF, NZC, KURT BEFOR ENCRYPTION AND NZC, KURT AFTER DECRYPTION
The following typical optimization problem based on Eu-
clidean distance is often used for solving the model (1): Min-
imize
(10)
and the corresponding algorithm is as follows [25, Th. 1].
NMF Algorithm:
Initialized: generate nonnegative matrices
randomly, then, calculate the best by iterative loop. For
iter=1: num
(11)
(12)
(13)
end
where num is the maximum iterative number, and the
added model (13) is used to fix the scale of the mixing matrix.
This is just one of the NMF algorithms, and the accuracy
of which will improve when the linear mixing matrix and the
original signal matrix are sparse [26].
D. Reconstruction
Just like decryption method based on ICA, the output of the
model (10) is the matrix composed of segments with ambigui-
ties of permutation and scale. To solve the permutation problem,
a simple method based on the number of zero-crossings (nzc)
is used in [11]. However, the index nzc is often unstable when
we aim at efficient estimations of the original segments. One
may find that index seems more robust. In Table I, a com-
parison is made for these two indexes before the encryption
and after the decryption, where the source comes from the first
frame of the speech in [11]. The test is made for three partitions
, respectively.
In the proposed cryptosystem, the information of the
original segments is used to solve the indeterminacy of the per-
mutation problem. The maximum and the minimum
of the waveform are still utilized to solve the scale ambiguity
problem [11]. Note that the outputs of the model (10) are esti-
mations of the original segments after preprocessing using RT,
in order to obtain the exact original segments, it is necessary
to process the outputs using the inverse regularization transfor-
mation (IRT), after solving the ambiguities of permutation and
scale. The source signal is recovered frame-by-frame using
the same method.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF NLF AND LINEAR MIXING MATRIX
As mentioned above, for the proposed cryptosystem, the se-
curity of the encryption relies mainly on the NLF and the level
of the decryption depends partly on the linear mixing matrix. As
such, the construction of the NLF and the linear mixing matrix
will be exploited in this Section.
A. Construction of NLF
In order to simplify the encryption and decryption, the as-
sumption , for , is used.
The NLF matrix is given by
(14)
where . The pa-
rameter is a amplitude modulation such that and
are well masked mutually in . It is used repeatedly together
with . The selection of is adaptive, since and
are known at the stage of encryption. Function is com-
posed of the principal components (PC) of , i.e., letting
be the eigenvector matrix of the covariance matrix ,
where denotes mathematical expectation, the function is
.
Then the plaintext is encrypted as
(15)
i.e.,
(16)
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where is the eigenvector matrix of the covariance matrix
. The model (16) can be rewritten in a scalar form as
(17)
If in the model (17), then the function is -condition-
ally invertible respect to , and the corresponding inverse
function is
(18)
According to the models (16) and (17), the encryption of the
proposed cryptosystem is simple. It is also convenient for de-
cryption, when and are known at the stage of the de-
cryption. Thus, can be obtained from model (18), and the
data matrix is attained. Then, (or can
be decrypted by the NMF algorithms. Using the same method,
the source can be decrypted frame-by-frame.
Noting that is calculated using the same method in
the encryption and the decryption, is used only for encryp-
tion, and can be inserted into the head data of the encrypted
signal in a definite format for transmission.
B. Construction of Linear Mixing Matrix
Since the accuracy of the NMF algorithm relies partly on the
characteristics of the mixing matrix [26]–[28], it is necessary to
select a proper mixing matrix for the nth frame. The fol-
lowing guidelines are given to select mixing matrix :
i) nonnegative and full column rank;
ii) nontrivial, i.e., there are at least two nonzero entries in
each row;
iii) as sparse as possible.
E.g., there are two nonzero elements in each row for sim-
plicity:
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(19)
where are random positive numbers
less than one. Note that some other forms of can also be
considered from the security point of view, e.g., the number of
the nonzero elements in each row may be different regularly.
C. Analysis of Security
Theorem 3: For the three typical attacks, the cryp-
tosystem encrypted by the model (8) keeps secure even
when the multitme padding method is used, if the function
is not -condition-
ally invertible respect to when , where
.
The proof is given in Appendix II
Remark: Considering the proposed cryptosystem, when the
nonlinear functions are selected properly, the security is equiv-
alent to the BSS/ICA-based method in [11], although the mul-
titme padding method is adopted.
For the NLF in the model (17), it is not -condi-
tionally invertible respect to when , for that
is a transcendental function. Also, it is quite difficult to ob-
tain the cipher using numerical methods. In fact, under the
conditions of and
is the mixture of , and
(including the amplitudes information of and , which
are mixed sufficiently by . Then, to obtain the cipher nu-
merically, the unknown and dynamic is one obstacle and
is another one, even though is fixed and a group
of may be known (e.g., Attack 3). Function in the
model (17) is not an invertible mapping with respect to ,
since and have the same PCs for any orthogonal matrix
.
Generally speaking, a secure NLF should be sensitive to
. Luckily, more complex NLF can be used to enhance the sen-
sitivity in (17), especially for , e.g., or
more complex such as hash or chaotic function. Moreover, it will
fail for decryption using similar ciphers (see Section V.C). Note
that the more complex NLF may be still a unilateral mapping to
, and the computational load does not increase remarkably for
both the encryption and the decryption.
As mentioned above, the encryption scheme based on the
model (17) is secure, according to the property of the NLF and
Theorem 3.
V. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Three simulations are made to express the shortcomings of
the cryptosystem proposed in [11] and the advantages of the
cryptosystem proposed here. Signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
is used to evaluate the recovery of the original segments:
(20)
where are the original segments of the nth
frame of the source signal, while is the recovered seg-
ment. denotes mathematical expectation. If in for-
mula (20) is replaced by the ciphertext , then it can also be
used to evaluate the mask of the original segments. A smaller
is better for encryption while a larger is better for de-
cryption. In general, SIR levels below 8–12 dB indicate a failure
in obtaining the desired segments [31], [43].
A. Simulation 1
This simulation is used to verify the Theorem 2, i.e., the cryp-
tosystem in [11] is not secure for the encryption of the sparse
signal when the one-time padding method is extended into the
multitme padding. Both of the source signal [see Fig. 2(a)] and
the encryption scheme are the same as in [11] except the usage
of ciphers. The source signal is split into four frames and
two segments for each frame after preprocessing [see Fig. 2(b)],
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Fig. 2. Encrypted segments and decrypted segments under Attack 1 for sparse speech signal. (a) Source speech signal with 110000 samples. (b) Eight original
segments                         and        . (c) Eight encrypted segments                and      . (d) Eight de-
crypted segments                         and         under Attack 1.
TABLE II
SIRS (DB) OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION USING BSS/ICA-BASED METHOD WITHOUT THE CIPHERS
i.e., . The key signals are generated uni-
formly with the numbers between -1 and 1, and they are used to
encrypt the four frames above, where the four underdetermined
mixing matrices are
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
Fig. 2(c) and (d) shows the encrypted segments and uncovered
segments under the Attack 1 (i.e., decrypted segments without
the cipher), respectively. Note that the proof of Theorem 2 also
supplies a method for decryption without the cipher. Table II
shows the indexes SIRs of the encryption and the decryption.
Since SIRs of the decrypted segments are all greater than 14
dB, the original segments are decrypted efficiently without the
cipher [15], [31]. Theorem 2 is verified.
B. Simulation 2
In this simulation, the proposed scheme is tested for a speech
encryption. The same source signal in [11] is used. After pre-
processing, the source is split into two frames and each frame is
split into four segments [see Fig. 3(a)], i.e., .
The segments are mutual independent approximately. Fig. 3(b)
shows the segments processed by RT in (4). Some indexes of
each segment are shown in Table III, including kurt, and
. Fig. 3(c) shows the keys which are generated uniformly
between and 1. Two frames of ciphertext signals which are
encrypted with the same are shown in Fig. 3(d). And the
model (17) is used for encryption, where two linear mixing ma-
trices are as following, respectively, the same NLF is used re-
peatedly and the parameter of the NLF is
(25)
(26)
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Fig. 3. Encrypted segments and decrypted segments for speech signal using the proposed method. (a) Eight original segments            and           .
(b) Eight segments after regularized transformation. (c) Four key signals        . (d) Eight encrypted segments         and          . (e)
Eight decrypted segments            and           after waveform reconstruction.
TABLE III
WAVEFORM INFORMATION OF, KURT  , AND  OF SPEECH SIGNAL AFTER PREPROCESSING
TABLE IV
SIRS (DB) OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION FOR SPEECH SIGNAL USING PROPOSED METHOD BASED ON NMF
At the stage of the decryption, the seed received from a
secure channel regenerates the key . Combining with the
ciphertexts, the nonlinear demixing is firstly operated based on
the undisguised NLF, according to the model (18). Then, the
linear demixing is operated using the NMF algorithm based on
the output of the first step. At last, the waveform is reconstructed
according to the information that is transmitted together with the
ciphertext, including the operation of IRT. Fig. 3(e) shows the
last decrypted segments, and the indexes SIRs of the encryption
and the decryption are shown in Table IV. According to which,
the source speech is well masked and efficiently decrypted. The
performance of the proposed cryptosystem is comparable with
the method in [11].
At the stage of preprocessing, the model (4) is used for RT,
and the form of IRT is the same as RT. So, the sign informa-
tion of the original segments will be used for the waveform re-
construction. Since the size of the matrix composed of the sign
information is the same as the ciphertext signal matrix, the trans-
mission of the data will increase remarkably (about 50%) if they
are transmitted separately. Note that each entry of the sign ma-
trix is 1 or , so it can be loaded to the ciphertext signal matrix
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Fig. 4. Encrypted segments and decrypted segments for image signal, using the proposed method and the BSS/ICA-based method, respectively. (a) Source image
and four original segments           . (b) Four encrypted segments         and four decrypted segments            using the proposed
method. (c) Four decrypted segments under Attack 1 and four decrypted segments using similar ciphers . (d) Four encrypted segments          and four
decrypted segments            using the BSS/ICA-based method.
at the corresponding position. It requires the latter to be trans-
formed into a positive matrix. Thereby, the sign matrix can be
extracted completely. Luckily, it is easy to implement by adding
a sufficiently large positive constant to the right side of the
model (17) to satisfy that . The constant can
also be inserted into the head data of the encrypted signal in
a definite format for transmission. Under this circumstance, re-
ceivers should extract the sign matrix from the ciphertext firstly;
subtract the constant from the rest ciphertext secondly; and
decrypt the ciphertext at last.
C. Simulation 3
In this simulation, an image signal is tested by our cryp-
tosystem and the cryptosystem proposed in [11], respectively.
At the stage of preprocessing, the source image is split into
four segments as one frame [see
Fig. 4(a)], and the segments are dependent. The matrix of the
correlation coefficients of the segments is
(27)
Table V shows the indexes of these four segments, including
kurt, , and . The same keys in the second simulation
TABLE V
WAVEFORM INFORMATION OF, KURT  , AND  OF IMAGE SIGNAL
AFTER PREPROCESSING
are used. Note that the source image is nonnegative. It needs not
RT in the preprocessing of the proposed cryptosystem.
When the proposed cryptosystem is tested, Monte Carlo
method with 95 times is used for decryption. The encrypted
segments and the average of decrypted segments are shown
in Figs. 4(b), and Fig. 5 shows the maximum and the min-
imum of SIRs of the recovered segments in every time. Since
RT is not necessary, IRT is canceled. The corresponding in-
dexes SIRs of the encryption and the decryption are shown
in Table VI, where Min denotes the minimum SIR in the
95 experiments, Max denotes the maximum SIR, and Mean
denotes the average SIR. At the stage of encryption, the linear
mixing matrix is the same as the model (25) for simplicity,
and the parameter of the NLF is also . The data
in Table VI show that the source image is well masked and
efficiently decrypted [see also Fig. 4(b)]. Under Attack 1, the
recovered images are shown in Fig. 4(c), and the SIRs (dB) are
. It verifies
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Fig. 5. SIRs of the decrypted segments through Monte Carlo experiments. Asterisk: minimum SIR of the four segments. Circle: maximum SIR of the four seg-
ments.
TABLE VI
SIRS (DB) OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION FOR IMAGE SIGNAL USING PROPOSED METHOD BASED ON NMF
that the source images are secure under Attack 1. Also, the
sensitivity of the proposed scheme with respect to the ciphers
is tested. The correlation of the selected ciphers with the
real ciphers is
(28)
SIRs (in decibels) of the decrypted images using the ciphers
are , and the
images are shown in Fig. 4(c). Although and are quite
correlative, it fails to decrypt the plaintexts. Thus, the sensitivity
is verified.
When the cryptosystem proposed in [11] is tested, the re-
sults of decryption using Comon’s Algorithm, the fast ICA algo-
rithm, and the Infomax algorithm are similar [16]. Thus, only the
fast ICA algorithm is utilized in this simulation. The encrypted
segments and the decrypted segments are shown in Fig. 4(d).
Table VII shows the indexes SIRs of the encryption and the de-
cryption. The low SIRs show that the cryptosystem proposed in
[11] fails for the image signal. Also, Theorem 1 is verified.
D. Discussions
Considering the traditional cryptosystems, the sources can be
decrypted analytically and the ciphers are used with the mul-
titme padding method [1], [2]. However, the security relies on
the apparently intractability of the computational problems. It is
still not ensured theoretically. The widely used cryptosystems
have been faced with more and more challenges, since the col-
lision of MD5 is proclaimed by Wang [32].
Note that the sources are composed of partly distorted sam-
ples in the speech and image communication, and they need
only be decrypted approximately. So, BSS technique may be a
useful tool for decryption [33]–[35]. Recently, a fast and attrac-
tive scheme based on BSS has been applied to speech encryption
[11]. The security of which is based on the difficulty of solving
the underdetermined BSS problem, and it can be ensured theo-
retically. However, the implicit method using one-time padding
costs too much in practice because of the frequent transfor-
mation, and it cannot be extended in to the multitme padding
method according to Theorem 2 (see also Simulation 1). The
data in Table II show that the source signal is decrypted effi-
ciently without the cipher when the multitme padding method
is used, though it is masked quite well. It can also be verified
in Fig. 2(c) and (d). Furthermore, the plaintext signals are as-
sumed mutually independent in [11]. That is to say, their cryp-
tosystem may fail for dependent signals which exist widely in
reality. Fig. 4(d) and the data in Table VII show that the accu-
racy of the decrypted image is not high, and it is even unaccept-
able for the first segment of the source image according to the
measure in [31], [43]. Also, the correlation levels of these four
segments are still low (see the model (27)), and it seems that the
effect of the decryption may be even worse if the segments are
more correlative.
From the implementation point of view about the proposed
cryptosystem, at the stages of preprocessing and encryption, the
operations are very fast, and the computational load is quite
low. Because of the NMF algorithm, the decryption may be
time-consuming. For alternate least-squares approach for NMF
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TABLE VII
SIRS (DB) OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION FOR IMAGE SIGNAL USING BSS/ICA-BASED METHOD
Fig. 6. Number of the nonzero entries in four nested areas according to the optimal seeking method.
utilized in this proposed cryptosystem, we found that the com-
putational complexity is approximately [40],
[41]. Therefore, roughly, the computational complexity of the
proposed scheme is also .
Compared with the cryptosystem proposed in [11], there are
mainly two advantages of our cryptosystem: 1) the method of
multitme padding makes it be more convenient; 2) the effect
of decryption is much better for dependent segments and sim-
ilar for independent segments. It also denotes that the decrypted
signal is the efficient estimation of the source signal, according
to the Listening Test in [11]. It is a prior cryptosystem to the tra-
ditional DES method, since 1) the length of cipher is dynamic,
the key space is nearly infinite, and the security can be ensured
theoretically; 2) the processes of encryption and decryption are
more simplified.
VI. CONCLUSION
A novel nonlinear cryptosystem using multitme padding is
proposed in this paper. The encryption relies on the construc-
tion of the nonlinear function that can ensure the security the-
oretically, and the decryption is equivalent to the NMF that is
blind or semiblind. Since the NMF does not rely on the statis-
tical characteristics such as Gaussianity and dependence, a large
of sources for communication can be processed efficiently by
our cryptosystem. Speech and image sources are tested in Sim-
ulation 2 and Simulation 3, respectively. It is very fast, and the
computational load is quite low.
Although the local extremum is a well-known trap for the
NMF, it can be overcome efficiently by the GPCG algorithm in
[28]. And the sparse transformation to the sources may improve
the accuracy of the decryption [26]–[28]. Furthermore, the spe-
cial construction of the linear mixing matrix and the waveform
information and of the original segments can guide
the selection of the initial values in the NMF algorithm. How-
ever, since the NMF is an iterated algorithm, the speed of the
decryption is still a problem to be exploited. Also, considering
the cryptosystems based on the blind or semiblind method, the
secure is enhanced at the cost of the reasonable decrease of the
decryption level, and they may be not useful when the sources
are required to be decrypted completely or analytically.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since the cipher can be used repeatedly when multitme
padding is performed, let three frames
be encrypted by the same cipher using the method in
[11]. According to the corresponding encryption scheme, the
following three mixing segments can be obtained from the
ciphertext without the cipher using ICA algorithms [14], [36]:
(29)
or equivalently in a scalar form as
(30)
where . On the other hand,
as and are sparse and is often not sparse
(otherwise, the plaintext can not be well masked), the extremum
of the following objective function exists
(31)
where -norm denotes the number of nonzero entries
. In fact, the minimum of appears at .
Note that the model (31) represents a single peak function with
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single variable, and can be obtained using the optimal
seeking method [37]. The values (i.e., in four
nested search areas are shown in Fig. 6. Then we get the linear
mixing of and
(32)
where , similarly,
(33)
where . The models (32), (33) can be rewritten as
(34)
where .
As sparse signals , and can be recov-
ered approximately from the model (34), using the methods
proposed in [20]–[22], then the plaintext can be decrypted effi-
ciently segment by segment (or frame by frame) from the cipher-
text without the cipher. Note that if , and
are not sparse, according to the model (30), the cipher can
be obtained directly by Attack 2 or Attack 3, except the ambi-
guities of permutation and scale which does not affect the de-
cryption when the BSS technology is used. By this reason, the
BSS/ICA-based cryptosystem using the multitme padding is not
secure. Theorem 2 is proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The scalar form of the model (8) is
. And
is a binary function of , i.e., in
Definition 2. The security of the proposed cryptosystem is
proved under the Attack 1–3.
i) Under Attack 1, since the ciphertext or is the
known information only, for in
the -conditional function of , the function is not
-conditionally invertible. Thus, or cannot
be calculated. Also, can not be recovered directly
using nonlinear BSS [38], [39]. As such, the plaintext
is secure.
ii) Under Attack 2, since the linear mixing matrix is
nonnegative and can be constructed, it is easy to select
the proper matrix such that its inverse matrix is not
nonnegative. At this time, the NMF is unilateral, i.e., one
cannot get from using the NMF. As a result,
the ciphertext or is still the known useful in-
formation only, and the cipher is secure.
iii) Under Attack 3, if one wants to obtain from ,
it is necessary that can be calculated through the
proper selection of the plaintext . Since the exact
mixing matrix is unknown and dynamic in different
encryption (though its form is fixed and public), there
exists only one possibility to get which does not
rely on . It is, the selected satisfies
, according to the public form of . Be-
cause the function is not -con-
ditionally invertible respect to when ,
the security of the cipher is ensured, even multitme
padding way is used. Theorem 3 is proved.
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